(NB: The following is lightly edited from a comment I made in discussion about the "Newspaper Crash" post at Winds of Change. While I'm assuming that readers of this blog are more likely to be familiar with the art of reading corporate financials than those at Winds, it occurred to me that some here might find this interesting as well. So consider this a sort of 'footnote' to the last post that didn't make it in due to length.)
How can the linked newsosaur post about high newspaper profits be correct if my crash-and-burn forecast is as well? The second half of the newsosaur post does go into the tricks used to prop up profits, to some of which I alluded, and which are now running out. My best reply is to lay out some of the logic I used when spelunking through the newspapers' corporate financial statements to develop my thesis.
The best thing to have, of course, would be some actual churn, margin per sub, and acquisition cost figures. You can bet the newspaper know these. A decently managed subscriber business not only will track them in aggregate, but will stratify cost, churn and margin figures by source of subscription, age of account, and any other variable that seems relevant. Looking at them comparatively, or as a time history, is one of the most important tools for enhancing profitability overall, and figuring out where to grow and where cut back. Given how sensitive this information is competitively, and to future values, it never gets published openly. You have to make deductions based on metrics that must be publicized.
One of the most interesting is balance sheet 'goodwill'. Here's a nice layman's level article about goodwill. The basic notion is:
When recording a business acquisition, a company is required to recognize the assets acquired on its financial statements at fair market value. Any excess of what the company paid beyond the fair market value of the assets acquired is goodwill.
So if one newspaper buys another for a price beyond its book value, the difference goes onto the balance sheet as 'goodwill'. The argument is the buyer is rationally paying a premium because it believes it can turn that asset into value down the road. It used to be that goodwill was amortized over 40 years, but that left too much room for balance sheets inflated by goodwill that was no longer 'good'. So in 2002 FASB changed the rules. Instead the business has to conduct at least an annual impairment review on its goodwill, and mark down the value if it looks like it can no longer be supported by future earnings potential. This has a downside that it can make nominal profit/loss 'lumpy' based on one-time events, but from an analytic point of view it helps because at least once a year you will see the conclusions drawn by an internal assessment of the ongoing business.
When buying a newspaper, almost all of the goodwill value will be due to subscriber lists and the 'masthead' (brand). Any physical plant assets will be included in the 'book' value anyway. So logically, the goodwill from buying a paper is a proxy measure of the potential future cash flows from the subscribers. As described in the OP, those are an outcome of churn and future margins (the acquisition cost is embedded in the goodwill and other purchase price.) So when the accountants and auditors do their assessment on the value of the goodwill, they are in effect giving us a surrogate measure for the business' own estimate of discounted cash flows from that subscriber base. They don't have to tell us the raw churn and margin statistics, but they do have to render an opinion from calculations that are inevitably dominated by those numbers.
What do we find? Take the current whipping boy of the industry, McClatchy. In late 2006, they bought the newspaper assets of Knight-Ridder, and leveraged up to do it. There was some stock in the deal, and they then disposed of a few papers. When the ball stopped bouncing, McClatchy's accountants listed $3.56 billion in goodwill at the end of 2006, which should have some relationship to their estimated discounted cash flows from those subscribers in the future.
Then what happened? At the end of 2007, McClatchy listed only $1.04 billion in goodwill. In both Q3 and Q4 of that year, it had massive write-offs of goodwill, attributed to impairment of the mastheads and other assets they had bought. Since most of that value must be attributed to the health of the ongoing subscriber base, we're given direct evidence that margins and churn must be deteriorating rapidly, the more so since the company felt obliged to take write-offs in two consecutive quarters. This ties back directly to what newsosaur is saying about deteriorating ad revenues, which speak to margin. The company is next scheduled to report on goodwill impairment at the end of 2008. It will make interesting reading.
What about a healthier company? At the end of 2007, Gannett listed goodwill of just over $10 billion. In Q2, its internal review led to a mark-down to $7.87 billion. This was also an 'off cycle' review, due to "softening business conditions within the company's publishing segment..." Gannett will also have its next annual goodwill review at the end of 2008. The remaining goodwill represents better than half the company's listed assets, so it could be interesting as well.
Another financial worth investigating, but harder to describe simply, is the company's cash flows. Actual cash position, and the degree of management discretion over its use, is what you want to know when a company's back is to the wall. (Notional depreciation and amortization, among others, don't matter if you won't survive to see the next fiscal year.)
I like to find something akin to free cash flow though (as the wikipedia article describes) it's not always a formulaic process because you may be seeing side-effects of overall business growth or shrinkage or lumpy capital investments. Take out taxes, which are not discretionary, and you've got some measure of the actual cash that management can employ without hitting the equity or debt markets. Then take out interest and any other debt carrying costs. What you've got left is what management actually gets to use to build the business or keep the wolf from the door. If the debt service gets large compared to the discretionary cash flow, you're set up to get squeezed if either your debt costs go up, or your margins go down. Without going into details, by those measures McClatchy is in deep trouble, Gannett looks pretty good until they have to roll over debt, and NYT looks better because they didn't leverage up.
Oh, yeah, the latest subscriber numbers just came out WSJ and USA Today are hangin' in there. Everyone else is dropping.